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PRAGMATISM, FEMINISM, AND THE 
PROBLEM OF BAD COHERENCE 
Catharine Pierce Wells* 
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY. By Margaret Jane Radin. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1993. Pp. xi, 265. $29.95. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Radin1 bases Reinterpreting Property on her well-
known and justly admired articles on property law and theory. It is 
a rich repository of original insight, lucid analysis, and sharp debate. 
None of the essays that it includes is entirely new.2 What is new is a 
long and substantive introduction that analyzes her ten-year project 
on property law in terms of the insights and methodological com-
mitments of philosophical pragmatism (pp. 1-34). This manner of 
developing a theory - beginning with substantive positions and 
only later articulating the method that spawns them - is a very 
pragmatic and remarkably useful way to proceed. Radin begins 
with the struggle to say something useful about standard issues in 
property law. As she pursues this project, she begins to reflect on 
the nature of the method and techniques she is using. These reflec-
tions are themselves very interesting and provocative - both as 
they shed light on the nature of Radin's own contributions to prop-
erty law and as an independent contribution to the more philosoph-
ical literature on legal method. 
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California. B.A. 1968, Wellesley College; 
M.A. 1973, Ph.D. 1981, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1976, Harvard. - Ed. I am 
grateful to the following people for their comments: Richard Craswell, Richard Ford, Trina 
Grillo, JoAnne Manfred, Ruth Anna Putnam, Richard Warner, and Stephanie Wildman. 
Special thanks to Megan Cosby and Mark Watkin for their research assistance and to Katie 
Waitman for her secretarial help. 
1. Professor of Law, Stanford University. 
2. Included in the book are versions of papers previously published as Margaret Jane 
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 {1982); Margaret Jane Radin, Resi-
dential Rent Control, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350 (1986). "Problems for the Theory of Abso-
lute Property Rights" (chapter 3) is adapted from Margaret Jane Radin, Diagnosing the 
Takings Problem, in NoMos XXXIII: COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 248 (John W. Chapman ed., 
1991); Margaret Jane Radin, Government Interests and Takings: Cultural Commitments of 
Property and the Role of Political Theory, in PUBUC v ALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Ste-
phen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993); Margaret Jane Radin, The Consequences of Conceptualism, 41 U. 
MIAMI L. REv. 239 (1986); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross 
Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988); Margaret Jane 
Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739 (1986). "The Rhetoric of 
Alienation" (chapter 7) was written in 1986 for a colloquium on property and rhetoric. 
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I have tried in this review to avoid restatements and analysis of 
Radin's substantive positions in property theory. These have al-
ready been the subject of much spirited debate in the literature.3 
Instead, I have focused on the question of method and the specific 
contribution that Radin's pragmatism makes to ongoing questions 
about the role of law in achieving social transformation. To do this, 
I have organized my comments around three main topics: first, the 
nature of Radin's pragmatism; second, its connection to her femi-
nism; and third, what she calls the problem of bad coherence. 
II. PRAGMATISM 
A. Anticonceptualism 
One of the chief tenets of pragmatism is its rejection of concep-
tualism. Pragmatism originated in Peirce's formulation of the prag-
matic maxim: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to 
have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our con-
ception of the object."4 This maxim commits pragmatism to a form 
of reductionism - the meaning of abstract concepts is limited to 
the sum total of the empirical expectations they generate. It follows 
that one.cannot increase the amount of our knowledge by logically 
dissecting the concepts we use. Conceptual methods5 do not work 
because, according to the pragmatic maxim, a concept is not the 
kind of thing from which we can deduce a priori knowledge. To the 
contrary, the suggestion that an abstract concept entails certain em-
pirical consequences is itself an empirical hypothesis that we must 
test through observation. Similarly, a pragmatic theory of law will 
not attempt formalistic deductions of legal rules from legal con-
cepts. 6 It will instead treat legal concepts as potential explanations 
3. See, e.g., Scott Altman, (Com)modifying Experience, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 315-16, 
340 nn.91-93 (1991); Tunothy J. Brennan, Rights, Market Failure, and Rent Control: A Com-
ment on Radin, 11 PHIL. & PuB. A.FF. 66 (1988); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 
YALE L.J. 1315, 1400 nn.309 & 322 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory 
of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L REv. 741, 770-74 (1988). 
4. 5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, THE CoLI..ECIED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 
'l[ 5.402 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1963). 
5. By "conceptual methods," I mean methods of reasoning that are entirely conceptual 
and contain no element of experiential confirmation. Obviously, conceptual methods can 
help us to become clearer about our semantic commitments. They can also be useful in the 
formation of scientific hypotheses. What the pragmatist denies, however, is that one can 
enrich our store of knowledge solely by abstract reasoning. 
6. See, e.g., OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, Possession, in THE COMMON LAW 163-94 (1963) 
(rejecting abstract theories of possession in favor of explanations that derive from the practi-
calities of property relations). 
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for particular doctrinal results and test them against the actual pat-
terns of legal decisionmaking.7 
A good illustration of this difference in legal method is provided 
by the contrast between Radin's work in property theory and that 
of Richard Epstein, whose work Radin criticizes (pp. 98-119). The 
difficulty with Epstein's method, she argues, is that it is too 
conceptual: 
Epstein is a conceptualist because he thinks there is a concept of 
property that, in fact, is the right (:>ne or the only one. He thinks, that 
is, that there is a conception of property that is the concept of prop-
erty. He is also a formalist ... because he thinks the concept of prop-
erty can be applied ... logically ... to yield results that should be 
obvious to readers and legal decision-makers.8 
She disputes the idea that property has "an essential, prepolitical" 
meaning that is "sufficiently precise and detailed to determine legal 
rules and outcomes in practice" (p. 99). 
By contrast, Radin bases her own work upon a recognition that 
American property law derives from a number of distinct, intellec-
tual traditions.9 When Radin analyzes a concept of property, she 
takes it as she finds it - not as an idealized concept that is unitary 
and unequivocal but as a concept that is replete with contradictions, 
inconsistencies, and real world imperfections. Thus, for Radin, the-
orizing about property is not simply a matter of deriving substantive 
rules from a single intellectual conception. Instead, property law 
must reconcile the conflicts generated by the diverse strands of 
property theory. 
For example, in an essay entitled "The Rhetoric of Alienation" 
(pp. 191-202), Radin describes the "double meaning" ascribed to 
the word "property." Property, she says, is both an object owned 
and an attribute possessed (pp.191-92). "Object-property" is based 
on the concept of ownership and is identified with the material ob-
ject that is owned. "Attribute-property," conversely, is based on 
the idea that certain characteristics constitute identity. An entitle-
ment to live in the White House, for example, might be considered 
an attribute-property of the presidency. Thus, for Radin, property 
theory must begin with the recognition that there are two - or 
7. For a fuller description of this process, see Catharine Pierce Wells, Holmes on Legal 
Method: The Predictive Theory of Law as an Instance of Scientific Method, 18 S. Ju.. U. LJ. 
329, 335-42 (1994). 
8. P. 100. Radin concludes this observation by saying, "Epstein's tacit acceptance of con-
ceptualism and formalism goes a long way toward explaining why he seems so blithely to 
believe that results many readers find breathtakingly wrong are just obvious to rational peo-
ple." P. 100. 
9. Among these are the labor-desert theory of Locke (p. 45), the expectation theories of 
Bentham (p. 43), and the personality theories of Kant and Hegel (p. 47). 
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more10 - distinct conceptions of property. Property can be under-
stood, on the one hand, as fungible items in trade or commerce and, 
on the other hand, as something that constitutes the personhood of 
the owner. Both of these conceptions have influenced the common 
law of property and, indeed, the competing effects of these two con-
cepts may well account for some of the conflicts in that tradition. 
Thus, Epstein's attempt to derive the substance of property law 
from a single concept of property is doomed to failure. Such at-
tempts inevitably overlook the tensions that underlie existing law 
and impoverish our understanding of a legal tradition whose genius 
lies precisely in its ongoing efforts to reconcile competing 
conceptions. 
B. Pragmatic Method 
It is sometimes easier to describe what pragmatism rejects than 
to identify its affirmative claims. This is especially true when it 
comes to pragmatic method. Nevertheless, the introduction to Ra-
din's book is suggestive. For Radin, pragmatism seems to entail 
two central methodological commitments. First, a theory should be 
useful for some particular purpose. Thus, writers must establish a 
dialectical relationship between theory and practice; it is not 
enough to formulate theory for an ideal world.11 Second, every the-
ory must be held tentatively and must be subject to ongoing revi-
sion in light of further experience.12 I will begin by showing how 
Radin's work exhibits these commitments. I will then go on to con-
sider more generally the pragmatic aspects of Radin's work. 
It is commonplace for pragmatists to insist upon a close connec-
tion between theory and practice.13 This seems sensible. A theory 
that has no intersection with practical things has little to off er us. 
Furthermore, speculative theorizing is often unreliable. Theories 
that are too abstract encounter the risk of collapsing into a muddle 
of imprecise concepts, unmarked and unsupported assumptions, 
and mistaken reasoning. By contrast, a theorist who routinely com-
pares abstract conceptions with practical experience can avoid these 
problems because this process entails continuous attention to the 
requirements of rigor and precision. 
Radin's commitment to the usefulness of theory is well illus-
trated by her attempt to relate her theoretical claims to the ongoing 
10. In this chapter (The Rhetoric of Alienation, pp. 91-202), Radin emphasizes \wo dis· 
tinct conceptions of property. In other contexts, her views are more complex. See infra text 
accompanying note 21. 
11. Pp. 1-2; see also p. 40. 
12. See, e.g., p. 4 (describing the evolution of Radin's theories). 
13. See, e.g., p. 29 ("Rather, for the pragmatist, theory is immanent and evolving; its de-
velopment goes hand in hand with practice."). 
May 1995) Pragmatism, Feminism, and Coherence 1649 
development of property doctrine. In law, the connection between. 
theory and practice can be very difficult to maintain. The law is a 
seamless web with many layers and types of theory and many odd 
doctrinal problems. A good legal theorist is therefore required not 
only to scale an entire mountain range of abstractions but also to 
catalogue carefully the trees and boulders she encounters on the 
way. This is slow and patient work that requires a rare combination 
of lofty spirit and a passion for particularity. Indeed, Radin's work 
exhibits both these qualities. She is able to ascend the peaks of high 
theory with great skill and dexterity and, at the same time, to illumi-
nate the rich terrain of common law decisionmaking. 
Another illustration of Radin's commitment to the usefulness of 
theory is her bifurcation of normative analysis into two questions: 
(1) What should happen in an ideal world?; and (2) What should 
happen in this less than ideal world? For example, Radin uses this 
distinction in her analysis of the takings problem: 
By ideal issues I mean issues about how we should decide the tak-
ings problem in a frictionless world of perfect good faith and perfect 
knowledge, including knowledge of justified theories of property and 
politics. In the ideal world of theory, those charged with carrying out 
law unfailingly do it correctly. By nonideal issues I mean issues con-
cerning how we should decide the takings problem in our world of 
ignorance, including theoretical disagreement and uncertainty, mis-
takes, and bad faith. The problem of transition concerns how much 
deviance from our ideals we should mandate in practice in our pres-
ent nonideal world to make the best progress toward our ideal world 
of theory. [p. 162] 
The distinction between ideal and nonideal theories is important to 
Radin because thinking about the ideal world enables her to de-
velop a coherent set of values whereas thinking about the nonideal 
actual world prevents her from slipping into the problems of utopi-
anism. But she does not overlook the fact that this approach is 
fraught with difficulties: 
It cannot be denied that this kind of strategic choice, like all of our 
political choices, involves a potential double bind. Attempting to 
transcend the deeply entrenched meaning of property might result in 
no progress, or in only illusory progress. . . . But provisionally ac-
cepting the entrenched meaning might further reinforce and entrench 
that meaning in our culture, and make future evolution even more 
difficult.14 
14. P. 27. Radin explains the intractability of the takings issue as in part arising 
from our inability to specify in any general way when we should be governed by the 
ideal and when we should pay attention instead primarily to the nonideal. Always in the 
midst of the transition, we are always unsure when we should lean toward theory and 
our hopes for progress and when toward practical politics and our realistic appraisal of 
the world as it is. 
P.162. 
1650 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:1645 
Nevertheless, her way of handling these questions is typically con-
textual and pragmatic: "I believe these double binds are a defining 
mark of political life, and I believe that they have no a priori theo-
retical solution. In practice, we must judge which alternative is bet-
ter on the whole, and we must keep reconsidering as circumstances 
change" (p. 27). 
The second of Radin's methodological commitments - the rec-
ognition that all beliefs must be held tentatively - is a central fea-
ture of her work, although she acknowledges that she has not 
always been clear on this point. Thus, she describes her earliest 
essay - "Property and Personhood" (pp. 35-71) - as follows: 
In my essay, I said that even if someone is bound up with a "thing," 
we nevertheless should not treat that "thing" as personal "when there 
is an objective moral consensus that to be bound up with that 
category of 'thing' is inconsistent with personhood or healthy self-
constitution. (p. 4) 
She then criticizes her own use of terms such as "objective," "con-
sensus," and "healthy." She used these terms, she says, because she 
had not, at the beginning, fully understood her own pragmatic 
method. With a clearer understanding of her pragmatism, she 
would now want to phrase her pragmatism differently - "objec-
tive" understandings are those "shared understandings that are, for 
now, too entrenched to be revisable by individuals" (p. 5). Her 
basic point is this: we begin with certain understandings about 
property that are too fundamental to be seriously questioned. 
These understandings are not "objective" in the sense that they de-
scribe timeless truths. Nor does their special status rely upon the 
notion of consensus.15 Instead, such understandings are an appro-
priate starting point solely because they are, in fact, the only place 
we can begin with true sincerity. Moreover, if someone questions 
such a starting point, we can merely restate the premise and say, 
with Wittgenstein: "[We] have reached bedrock, and [our] spade is 
turned. "16 
Although I have shown how Radin's work conforms to her un-
derstanding of the commitments of pragmatic method, the discus-
sion thus far has failed to capture the fullness of Radin's method. 
Pragmatic method requires a certain complexity of analysis. The 
15. The phrase "for now, too entrenched to be revisable by individuals" may suggest to 
some that Radin bases her theory on certain fundamentally shared values. I think this is a 
misreading. The fact that values are embedded in our language does not make them objects 
of universal assent because at the moment they are articulated many might wish to express 
their dissent. The values are entrenched not because they command universal assent but 
because they are so essential to an understanding of current practices that they cannot easily 
be foresworn until there is a full-bodied alternative. 
16. LUDWIG WrrrGENSTEIN, PHn.osOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 'JI 217 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 1953). 
May 1995] Pragmatism, Feminism, and Coherence 1651 
following quotation from Peirce perhaps best conveys that 
complexity: 
Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, 
so far as to proceed only from tangible premisses which can be sub-
jected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and 
variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its 
reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weak-
est link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided 
they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.17 
The above description might well evoke Radin's critique of Epstein 
described earlier.1s Epstein was wrong, she argue<;!, in trying to de-
duce the normative outlines of property law from an intellectual 
conception of property. Instead, property law must be understood 
in a number of different contexts. On the one hand, property law is 
the embodiment of many different political and legal traditions. On 
the other hand, it is also profoundly shaped by culture, by custom, 
and by the ever shifting realities of daily life. This fact requires 
Radin to analyze property law in relation to the diverse aspects of 
human experience, and the complexity of this task, in turn, requires 
her to reject the traditional "chains" of conceptual theory in favor 
of a "cable" of "slender" but "numerous" fibers. 
The cable that Radin is constructing is the general concept of 
property as personhood (pp. 35-71). Her d~velopment of this 
theme proceeds in pragmatic fashion. She begins with an intuitive 
understanding of the way in which we invest our personhood in par-
ticular items of property. She then develops this intuition by trac-
ing its roots in the personality theory of property.19 In discussing 
this theory, she is neither propo:Qent nor radical critic. She is not 
proposing to solve the dilemmas of modem property law by adopt-
ing the values of Hegel and Kant - whatever endorsement she 
gives these values is ambivalent at best. Rather, her technique is to 
appropriate the German tradition for her own purposes or, in her 
more modest characterization, to "build upon some of Hegel's in-
sights" (p. 47). At the same time, she is careful to separate the 
German concept of personhood from the intuitive personhood con-
ception she is proposing. We should distinguish the German con-
ception, she argues, from the intuitive conception because the 
German view "assumes away" many of the attributes of per-
17. 5 PEIRCE, supra note 4, 'l[ 5.265. 
18. See supra section II.A. 
19. See generally G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1942) (1821); IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF TiiE METAPHYS-
ICS OF Ennes (Thomas Abbott trans., 10th ed. 1946). 
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sonhood that are a vital part of the intuitive conception.20 Never-
theless, the German concept has continued vitality in its resonance 
with the intuitive understanding of property as personhood. It is 
this resonance that reinforces Radin's claim that property must be 
understood in the context of its emotional connection to human ex-
perience and, in turn, supports her conclusion that property must 
sometimes be protected because of this emotional connection (pp. 
70-71). Thus, Radin uses the German concept- imperfect though 
it may be - to illuminate contemporary property practices and to 
argue for their reform. 
It should be obvious from the above that we should not look at 
Radin's work as the embodiment of a single analytical structure -
she is not simply applying German property theory to modem 
problems in property law. Instead she is, in Peirce's terms, weaving 
a "cable" of property theory from many different "fibers" - from 
intuition, ordinary experience, tradition, and doctrine, as well as 
from abstract philosophical thought. But, with all these "fibers," 
we should not lose track of the general purposes that govern her 
work. Her examination of contemporary property law is not simply 
descriptive. The point of looking at the law's relationship to so 
many different things -to the various intellectual theories of prop-
erty, to our evolving cultural commitments with respect to property, 
to our ongoing practices with respect to property relations, and to 
the activities of courts in ruling on property claims - is to criticize 
current practices and to propose reforms. Where then, we might 
well ask, does Radin obtain the values that underlie her criticism 
and her claims for reform? As a pragmatist, Radin surely rejects 
the idea that value comes from abstract intellectual conceptions: all 
theories - even theories of value - must come from real world 
practices. Thus, it is necessary for Radin to identify the ideals and 
aspirations that underlie our current practices while at the same 
time using these ideals to formulate a critique of these same prac-
tices. In the next section, I will consider the bootstrapping difficul-
ties that this entails. 
C. Facts and Values and the Problems of Relativism 
In her Introduction, Radin places considerable emphasis on her 
belief that there is no "sharp distinction" between fact and value 
(p. 3). She writes: 
Both descriptive and evaluative understandings are constructed 
from the totality of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. Our 
circumstances include, blurred together, both the problems we need 
20. P. 44. Further, she argues, we must sever the German concept from its undesirable 
connection to the idea that respect for property and possession is simply a matter of respect-
ing an individual human will. Pp. 45-47. 
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tools to solve and our visions and desires for a better future. Obser-
vations about the world we face "out there" help to construct our 
values, and our values help to construct our observations about the 
world. [p. 4] 
The committed pragmatist will find this a nice statement of one of 
the central features of a pragmatic philosophy.21 For the uncom-
mitted, however, such statements are the source of much frustra-
tion. For such a person, the denial of a distinction between fact and 
value may seem like a descent into avoidable confusion. Alterna-
tively, it simply may seem mistaken. To be sure, facts and values 
are different. Indeed, using the phrase "denying the distinction" in 
this context is in some respects an overstatement. 
What is really happening when pragmatists "deny the distinc-
tion" is that they are rejecting the claims of a particular kind of 
empiricist theory.22 These theories describe the distinction in terms 
that are loaded with epistemological significance. Thus, for exam-
ple, these theories characterize factual judgments as empirical, de-
scriptive, and objective. Value claims, conversely, are nonempirical, 
normative, and subjective. Furthermore, the contrast between 
these two terms goes beyond such characterizations. Factual judg-
ments, properly phrased and tested, are said to command high de-
grees of consensus. Normative judgments, by contrast, are 
considered to be highly controversial. Factual judgments, these the-
ories continue, are unable by themselves to motivate or justify 
human action in the absence of a commitment to certain values. 
Values are an essential touchstone for judging the desirability or 
correctness of any course of action. These distinctions might be 
summarized in two columns: 
FACT VALUE 
science ethics 
descriptive normative 
objective subjective 
consensus controversial 
not motivational motivational 
21. Radin follows this statement with a quotation: " 'This insistence on the total entan-
glement of the particular with the universal, the so-called factual with the so-called norma-
tive, is at the heart of pragmatism.'" P. 4 (quoting Hilary Putnam, in Afterword: Symposium 
on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1911, 1915 
(1990)). 
22. The logical positivism of the mid-twentieth century typifies the kind of theory that 
pragmatists reject See, e.g., ALFRED JuLES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LoGIC (1952). 
While few people would describe themselves today as positivists, the movement survives in 
many common philosophical moves including the assertion of a particular kind of distinction 
between fact and value. 
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The pragmatic attack on the fact-value distinction is not so much an 
attack on the distinction itself as it is an attack on the bundling of 
this group of distinctions. Descriptive statements may differ from 
normative statements, but, according to the pragmatist, the differ-
ence is merely one of degree and is fundamentally misdescribed by 
the above bundle of characterizations. 
There are many philosophers who would agree with the pragma-
tist's rejection of this bundle of contrasting characteristics. For ex-
ample, there are some moral theorists who would disagree with the 
claim that value judgments are inevitably subjective. Kant, for ex-
ample, asserts the possibility of objective moral judgments based on 
reason.23 Similarly, many contemporary legal theorists argue for 
the objectivity of normative claims.24 What is distinctive about the 
pragmatist position is that it does not rest upon a simple assertion 
of the objectivity of normative judgments. Rather, pragmatism 
questions the fundamental bifurcation between fact and value. 
First, it does this by recognizing that value judgments are an inher-
ent part of empirical inquiry. Science is regulated by logic, by rea-
son, and by the requirements of the scientific method. These 
requirements are normative in character, and yet there could be no 
scientific or empirical knowledge without them. Second, pragma-
tism denies the standard of objectivity that is purportedly set by 
empirical science. Science, in a pragmatic theory, is a tentative sys-
tem of interdependent judgments that must always be revised to 
account for additional data. No individual judgment is beyond the 
scope of this revision except as we choose to make it so. Objectiv-
ity, on this account, is a conception that is not based on some God-
like accuracy or upon the notion of unshakable foundations but 
rather upon the ideas of coherence and consensus. Human per-
spectives will always be partial - what makes some judgments bet-
ter than others is not their objectivity but the fullness of the 
perspectives from which they are made.25 Thus, under the prag-
matic conception of truth, it makes sense to speak of truth as being 
relative to a perspective or to a preexisting set of theories. 
This conception of truth raises three distinct problems. The first 
is the problem of starting points - how do we choose our back-
ground theories and perspectives? The second is the problem of 
relativis~ - how do we justify our conclusions when they are ad-
mittedly relative to a somewhat arbitrary starting point? The third 
problem is motivational - if truth and values are relative to who 
23. KANT, supra note 19. 
24. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY {1977); Charles Fried, The 
Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History, 9 J. LEGAL Sroo. 335 
{1980); Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 1061. 
25. For a fuller discussion of this concept of objectivity, see THOMAS NAGEL, Subjective 
and Objective, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 196 {1979). 
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we are, what motivation could we ever have to transform ourselves 
or our political practices? 
To address the first problem, Radin makes a typically pragmatic 
move. I noted earlier that Radin's starting point is the current set 
of beliefs and practices with respect to property law.26 Thus, her 
analysis begins with what she takes to be our current understand-
ings - those "that are, for now, too entrenched to be revisable by 
individuals" (p. 5) - and uses these as a kind of baseline for her 
inquiry. This is, no doubt, a sensible starting point, but it does not 
provide us with much help in resolving the second and third 
problems described above. Pragmatic theories are progressive and 
prophetic27 and thus require an ability to assert the desirability of 
certain outcomes. It is fine to say that we should begin our analysis 
with current beliefs, but it is another thing to say that these beliefs 
provide an adequate basis for a critique of contemporary practices. 
After all, this forces us to choose between the imperfections of our 
current beliefs and those of our current practices. We may be more 
committed to our beliefs than to our practices, or vice versa, but 
this psychological fact falls short of providing a justification for per-
mitting beliefs to dominate over practices. These problems are 
commonly thought to be the Achilles heel of pragmatism: if ra-
tional thought cannot provide a foundation for both empirical and 
normative claims then how can the law - or, for that matter, life 
itself - be anything other than a mindless repetition of current 
practices. In other words, a pragmatic method seems a salient way 
to analyze current practices but a less salient way to articulate re-
forms of these same practices. 
How do we, as pragmatists, propel ourselves forward and im-
prove our situation? How do we engage in progressive thought and 
activity? The pragmatic response to these questions is often vague 
and not very satisfactory. Commonly pragmatists say something 
like the following: as pragmatists we struggle with the inconsisten-
cies between our convictions and our practices and, over time, be-
come clearer and more coherent about the nature of reality and our 
part in it. But this is only a partial answer. In the final section, I 
will return to these questions and consider Radin's own particular 
response to these issues. 
26. See supra section H.B. 
27. One author uses the tenn "prophetic" to "harken back to the rich, though flawed, 
traditions of Judaism and Christianity that promote courageous resistance against, and re-
lentless critiques of, injustice and social misery." Camel West, The Limits of Neopragmatism, 
63 S. CAL. L. RE.v. 1747, 1750 (1990). 
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III. FEMINISM 
While Radin spends the Introduction trying to define her prag-
matism, she says virtually nothing about the relationship between 
her work and feminism.28 This omission is notable because Radin is 
a self-proclaimed feminist whose work is richly interlaced with fem-
inist insight.29 Indeed, feminist theorists widely recognize her as a 
colleague and an inspiration.30 It is therefore not surprising that 
there is much in Radin's work on property that is both deeply femi-
nist and closely related to concerns that are part of the traditional 
feminist agenda. Nevertheless, I should be clear that Radin's work 
is not "feminist theory" in any stereotypical way. Overly simplistic 
conceptions of feminist theory tend to restrict feminism to insights 
that are based upon women's unique experience. Alternatively, 
they imagine that feminist theory must focus on issues that are tra-
ditionally of greater concern to women than men - issues such as 
sexual harassment, domestic violence, job discrimination, or child 
care. In addition, there is frequently a simplistic notion that femi-
nist theory paradoxically rejects theory - that it is "antitheoreti-
cal" in the sense that it attacks all forms of abstraction and 
theorizing.31 
None of these stereotypes would be accurate descriptions of Ra-
din's work. While she insists that theory have a close and dialecti-
cal relationship with experience,32 and while she certainly believes 
that all experience is gendered in the sense that it "belongs" to a 
person who is one gender or another, her theories of property do 
not claim to be specially privileged by her own female-type experi-
ence. Nor does Radin confine her insights to issues that are of spe-
cial interest to women - her subjects are the standard problems of 
property law. Finally, one could never characterize Radin's work as 
antitheoretical. She generously strews her texts with references to 
the canon of western legal and political thought. Indeed her work 
on property is greatly enriched by her familiarity with such tradi-
tional "male" writers as Hegel, Kant, Locke, and Bentham. 
28. Indeed the index does not even have entries for feminism or gender. 
29. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1699 (1990). 
30. See, e.g., Anita L Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEo. L.J. 1759, 
1762 n.15 (1988); Sherry F. Colb, Words- that Deny, Devalue, and Punish: Judicial Responses 
to Fetus-Envy, 72 B.U. L. REv. 101, 119-20 n.74 (1992); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and 
Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 
43 DUKE L.J. 879, 894-95 & nn.82-83, 943 (1994). 
31. See, e.g., Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 
YALE LJ. 1373 (1986). Several astute criticisms of this feminist tendency can be found 
throughout A MIND OF ONE'S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND 0BJECilVITY (Lou-
ise M. Antony & Charlotte Witt eds., 1993); see also Martha Nussbaum, Feminists and Philos-
ophy, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Oct. 20, 1994, at 59. 
32. See infra Part IV. 
May 1995] Pragmatism, Feminism, and Coherence 1657 
That Radin does not embrace an oversimplified version of femi-
nist theory can hardly be considered a deficit. During the past ten 
years, the simplified forms of feminist theory have encountered a 
number of problems. Feminist theory has an important agenda. 
Beginning with Simone de Beauvoir,33 modem feminists have 
pointed to the obvious - gender is such a pervasive feature of the 
human enterprise that whether one experiences the world as a 
woman or as a man makes a substantial difference in one's percep-
tions. Because modem empiricism holds that all science and theory 
rest upon experience, it follows that science and theory done exclu-
sively by men will not include "women's experience" and, as a re-
sult, s-:.ich theories will be only partial - they will adapt well to the 
needs of men but poorly to the needs of women. As a corrective, 
feminists have offered a thorough articulation of "women's experi-
ence" and a systematic attempt to revise contemporary wisdom in a 
way that will include women's wisdom and women's interests. 
In the legal arena, there is much to be said for this agenda. 
When the criminal law considers rape exclusively from the view-
point of the alleged perpetrator, it does an injustice to female vic-
tims.34 In addition, when we classify job-related sexual harassment 
as "personal" conduct, we miss a very important aspect of sex dis-
crimination.35 Nevertheless, there are deep and substantial 
problems with this approach. Perhaps the most important for femi-
nist theory is the problem of essentialism.36 Theories that are based 
upon "women's experience" must face the difficulty that "women's 
experience" is not a unitary thing. There are many women, many 
different kinds of women's experience, and thus, some argue, many 
feminisms. When a feminist speaks in terms of a single, uniform 
"women's experience," the result may be to suppress further the 
experience of women who are different from her - often women 
who are silenced not only by their gender but also by their race, 
their class, their sexual orientation, or even by a simple lack of ac-
cess to scholarly debate. For this reason, feminists who fail to deal 
concretely with the problem of essentialism may end up freeing 
their own voices at the expense of those women who are multiply 
oppressed by the wider society.37 
33. This is the general argument that de Beauvoir makes in The Second Sex. SIMONE DE 
BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Bantam Books 1961). 
34. See SusAN Esnuca, REAL RAPE (1987). 
35. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). 
36. See, e.g., EUZABETii v. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION 
IN FEMINIST THOUGIIT (1988). 
37. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKE-
LEY WOMEN'S LJ. 191, 204-14 (1989-90); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist 
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); see also SPELMAN, supra note 36, at 114-32. 
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The oversimplified model of feminist theory creates a second 
problem by its supposed rejection of abstract theorizing. By em-
bracing the concrete, feminism insists that legal debate be based 
upon the lived realities of real people. Experience, feminism re-
minds us, should not be read through the :filtering lens of male insti-
tutions and male intellectual constructs. One of the ways in which 
women have been silenced, however, is that few theorists have gen-
eralized and abstracted their38 experience in such a way that it can 
be adequately addressed in mainstream debates about normative 
theory. 
"Male experience" is frequently the focus of theoretical distinc-
tions that operate in the legal arena. For example, under certain 
circumstances, the common law reduced the crime of murder to 
manslaughter if it happened in the course of a barroom fight or if it 
was provoked by marital infidelity.39 Among provocations for vio-
lence, these situations were relatively common and the rules that 
governed the availability of these doctrines were technical and com-
plex. For women, though, domestic abuse is a far more common 
provocation for murder. The tendency, however, is to treat all do-
mestic abuse as one psychosocial syndrome. There are few distinc-
tions made between types of abuse and little attempt made to 
consider the limits on the extent of excuse and justification that spe-
cific instances of abuse might offer. Thus, most of the jurisdictions 
that recognize a "battered woman defense" do so only in accord-
ance with the standard requirements of self-defense and insanity 
doctrine.40 This is not surprising - to the extent that "women's 
experience" is undertheorized and underanalyzed, it is not fully 
comprehensible to those who settle legal controversies. For this 
reason it would make sense for feminism to move beyond the rejec-
tion of "male theories" and to move forward with a project of 
retheorizing "women's experience."41 
In describing these two problems, I do not mean to suggest that 
feminism is a doomed enterprise. I only suggest that the easy an-
38. Note how the use of the phrase "their" experience assumes a certain kind of 
essentialism. 
39. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 7.10(b)(2) & 
7.10(b)(5) (2d ed. 1986). 
40. See State v. Kelley, 478 A.2d 364 (NJ. 1984) (treating expert testimony as to battered 
woman syndrome as relevant to the issue of self defense); State v. Nonnan, 378 S.E.2d 8 
(N.C. 1989) (rejecting claim of perfect self defense based on battered woman theory). 
41. The reader will note that I continue to use the phrase "women's experience" sur-
rounded by scare quotes. The reason for this is to highlight the fact that, as the problem of 
retheorizing women's experience becomes more pressing, the problem of essentialism be-
comes even more difficult. If feminism were simply a matter of articulating experience on a 
concrete level, there would be room for many different windows on women's experience and 
consequently room for many feminisms. If generalization, abstraction, and the doing of the-
ory are necessary parts of the plan, however, then the substance of these abstractions may 
well become contested ground among the many feminisms. 
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swers to the question - "What is feminist theory?" - are fraught 
with difficulty. Furthermore, these difficulties might prompt us to 
take a somewhat more pragmatic approach to defining the enter-
prise. Instead of trying to analyze Radin's work in terms of the 
traditional understandings about feminist theory, it might be more 
useful to start with the idea that feminist theory is what feminists 
like Radin do. Understanding the strength of her work may well 
improve our understanding of the potential for feminist theory and, 
at the same time, suggest how feminists might begin to address the 
twin problems of essentialism and the undertheorization of 
"women's experience." In short, if we are currently unclear about 
what feminist theory is or about what it might aspire to, then per-
haps we can make some pragmatic progress by determining what it 
is about Radin's work that makes it successful as feminist theory. 
Before examining Radin's feminism, we must recognize that Ra-
din's property theories stand in a particular relation to traditional 
"male" theories. I noted earlier that she uses the work of Kant and 
Hegel to elucidate her own intuitive conception of property as per-
sonhood.42 By doing this, she provides a certain familiarity and 
resonance to her own intuitive conceptions. From a feminist per-
spective, however, there is a definite downside to this use of tradi-
tional theory. The references to Hegel and Kant seem to suggest 
that intuitions about property are largely gender-neutral. If they 
were not, Radin's use of these writers in such a central expository 
role might be a threat to the integrity of her own "feminist" insight. 
Did it not worry her, a feminist might ask, that the intuitions born 
of her "women's experience" might be hopelessly confounded by 
associating them with such abstract "male" theories of property? 
Much of feminist theory has been concerned with insisting upon 
the uniqueness and incomparability of male and female experience 
and the theories these experiences generate.43 But Radin's more 
pragmatic brand of feminism seems to reject this move. For Radin, 
there is a realm of theoretical discourse that is accessible to both 
men and women and is, at the same time, an important tool for 
understanding the world around us. The possibility of such a realm 
follows from her particular combination of pragmatism and femi-
nism. As a pragmatist, she recognizes that there is a dialectical rela-
tion between theoretical discourse and experience - that certain 
pervasive "male" theoretical terms play an important role in con-
structing "female" experience.44 As a feminist, she recognizes that 
42. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
43. See, e.g., CATiiARINE A. MAcKINNoN, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: D1scouRSES ON LIFE 
AND LAw {1987); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 1 {1988). 
44. For a pragmatist, all knowledge is held relative to a preexisting web of beliefs, atti-
tudes, and theoretical constructs. Women, therefore, have no choice but to utilize familiar 
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differences in "male" and "female" experience may lead to differ-
ent theoretical constructs. The combination of these beliefs entails 
a more realistic feminist epistemology: as feminists, we must begin 
with our actual experience - experience that is constructed both 
by our female situation and by the traditionally "male" theories 
that dominate our culture. For this reason, Radin is not concerned 
with leaving traditional theories behind in favor of a pure breed of 
feminist theory. Instead she attempts to appropriate traditional 
theories and to redirect them toward her own feminist project -
the reconceptualization of property doctrine in ways that make its 
relationships to gender and power explicit. 
Keeping in mind that Radin's feminism is pragmatic in the sense 
described above, I will turn now to a description of the feminist 
aspects of her work. I will examine, in particular, three characteris-
tics of her work that seem to give it power and depth and that are, 
at the same time, obviously related to the feminist enterprise. 
The first characteristic related to the feminist enterprise is the 
fact that her work is firmly rooted in a world of human experience 
and emotion. Radin does not purport to articulate "the view from 
nowhere."45 Her voice is theoretical, to be sure, but it is neither 
detached nor rigidly conceptual. Her analysis is well focused on the 
dialectical relationship between law and human life. Radin's per-
sonhood theory is a good illustration of this. Her theory stems from 
the intuition that property interacts with people in many different 
ways. People may feel one way about widgets and gas caps but en-
tirely differently about wedding rings, homes, and pictures of their 
children. Although it is true that some property is held instrumen-
tally, it is also true that some is not. Some property interacts with 
its owner's self-perception in such a way that it carries a real invest-
ment of the owner's personhood. Radin argues that such property 
must be protected precisely for this reason (p. 71). The result is a 
theory that not only analyzes property as an intellectual concept but 
also examines its ongoing interaction with human experience. 
Thus, for Radin, the point of legal theory is to focus upon the com-
plex dialectic between law and daily life and to define a normative 
world that is responsive to the emotional and practical realities that 
arise from this dialectic. Certainly, Radin's pursuit of such a world 
is one of the things that gives her work its feminist tone. 
The second characteristic of Radin's work related to the femi-
nist enterprise is that she keeps issues of gender and power in the 
forefront when she describes the relationships between property 
concepts and categories as they experience the world from within this web and interpret their 
experience within its framework. 
45. The phrase comes from a book of the same title: THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM 
NOWHERE (1986). 
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and human experience. This does not mean that she focuses partic-
ularly on issues that have a gender bias. She is not, for example, 
particularly concerned with alimony or with the rules of dower and 
curtesy. In fact, her analysis seems to transcend gender. Property 
as personhood, for example, is a concept equally applicable to fe-
male and male experience.46 Even so, there are feminist conse-
quences of this kind of analysis. Once we view property as a part of 
the web of human experience and emotion, its relationships to gen-
der become apparent. Indeed, Radin's articulation of the per-
sonhood aspects of property relations is a good example of this kind 
of feminist insight. Without the connection to personhood, the ab-
stract concepts of property and ownership may seem to be gender-
neutral - property is property whether it belongs to a man or a 
woman. Once we understand that people invest a part of them-
selves in certain property, however, we can see that relationships to 
property are inherently related to issues of gender and power. 
Thus, Radin helps us to understand that property has to do not just 
with wealth, but also with self-esteem and self-confidence, human 
happiness, and human flourishing. Property is one of the tools that 
facilitates life. It is one of the things we use to make our way in the 
world. Thus, in Radin's theory, a misallocation of property will not 
simply deprive a person of material objects; it will also affect funda-
mental issues of empowerment. 
The third characteristic of Radin's work related to the feminist 
enterprise is that her writing is fundamentally strategic. Property 
law raises a wide range of issues and Radin's choice of issues is 
quite distinct - even conventional issues are framed in unconven-
tional ways. Although it is no doubt true that these choices were 
largely instinctive, the book provides a fine opportunity for her to 
explore, ex post facto, why she made the choices she did. Not sur-
prisingly, she concludes that her choices were largely practical -
that she had instinctively directed her attention to those areas of 
the law in which it appeared to her that a better understanding 
would be "useful" (p. 3). This, of course, poses the pragmatic ques-
tion: "Useful for what?" "What problem," she asks, "is best solved 
by understanding the social world in this way?" (p. 3). 
For Radin, such inquiries inevitably implicate the concept of 
human flourishing, and this concept, in tum, raises even more fun-
damental issues: 
To what extent do "we" possess a persuasive conception of human 
flourishing? Or is the concept of human flourishing too deeply con-
46. For example, the connection between property and personhood is not gender-specific. 
If the example of wedding rings tends to suggest that women may have more personhood 
interest in property, one need only consider the relationship of many men to their cars, their 
stereos, or their tools. 
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tested to admit of one conception that is properly "ours"? In light of 
this conception (or, these conceptions), what property relations - if 
any - are appropriate? [p. 6] 
These are strange questions for a feminist. Some feminist theories 
may seem to suggest that gender differences are a zero-sum game 
- what is one person's empowerment is inevitably someone else's 
subordination. Radin does not, however, embrace this view. She 
does not propose to overthrow the rule of law or to engage in radi-
cal reconstructions of legal doctrine. Rather her project is more 
reformist and pragmatic. She begins with law largely as it stands 
and proceeds to suggest ways in which it could be adapted to the 
needs of real people. Thus, despite the lack of radical critique,47 
Radin's work has an indisputably radical purpose - to reconceptu-
alize the abstractions that constitute property law in terms of their 
genuine connections to the lives of real people. Moreover, because 
it is frequently subordinated people who are most disempowered by 
the detached abstractions of traditional legal theory, this is a pro-
gram with substantial political consequences. 
To summarize, there are at least three areas in which Radin's 
pragmatism coincides with her feminism. First, her theories are sit-
uated in the daily realities of human experience. Second, because 
her theories are so situated, they recognize the tangible reality of 
gender and power. Third, her writing is strategic - it is meant to 
be useful to an ongoing project of appropriating legal theory to the 
needs of real people. Yet, as Radin is a pragmatist, her feminism is 
distinctive in its recognition of the moral ambiguities of daily life 
and in its placement of these ambiguities at the very center of its 
analysis. Many feminist writers tend toward the utopian. There are 
some, for example, who are uncompromising in their rejection of 
prevailing culture. In addition, there are some who seem to glorify 
a pure and essential conception of "women's experience." Finally, 
there are some who debate gender issues in teleological terms: 
What is our ultimate goal? Are we fighting for special or equal 
treatment? Do we want a society that is androgynous or one that is 
dominated by female norms and ideals? As interesting as these 
questions are, they seldom lead to real advances in the material 
conditions that oppress women. These questions are too abstract 
and those who ask them are too little mindful of the realities that 
confront subordinated people. Radin, however, as a pragmatic 
feminist, treats feminism as one of a number of progressive forces 
47. This is essentially the criticism Stephen J. Schnably offers in Property and Pragma· 
tism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1993). 
Radin's reply can be found in Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory: 
A Response, 45 STAN. L. REv. 409 (1993). 
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in a world that is complicated by double binds48 and the inevitable 
political compromise of participation in the surrounding culture. 
But, as I indicated earlier,49 the pragmatic approach brings its 
own set of problems. Its very lack of utopianism seems to disable it 
from becoming a vehicle for substantial change. Radin is forthright 
in her description of the problem: 
Some [critics on the left] consider pragmatism to be inherently con-
servative, primarily for two reasons. First, if there can be no transcen-
dent transformative theory by which all progress is measured, then (it 
is argued) the pragmatist meliorist spirit results not in real progress 
but rather only in ineffectual tinkering. Second, if pragmatism meas-
ures the goodness of the law, or of.proposals for change, or of theo-
ries of social justice, by "coherence" or "fit" with what we already 
accept, then the more firmly entrenched is the status quo the harder it 
will be to avoid blindly reaffirming it. [p. 29] 
These observations lead her to confront what she calls the problem 
of bad coherence. 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF BAD COHERENCE 
Radin describes the problem of bad coherence in the following 
terms: 
Some pragmatists endorse coherence theories of truth or good-
ness, in which any given proposition or value is judged by how well it 
hangs together with the whole system of propositions or values to 
which we are committed. If a pragmatist defines truth or goodness by 
means of coherence, then how can the pragmatist recognize a system 
that is coherent but bad, such as institutionally coherent and perva-
sive racism or sexism? [pp. 29-30] 
As such, she diagnoses the problem as resulting from an incomplete 
pragmatism: 
[P]ragmatists who rely on institutional coherence this way are incom-
plete pragmatists. They are throwing out the other half of the prag-
matist spirit - the importance of our critical visions and imaginative 
recreations of our world. Inconsistent pragmatists are disabled from 
critique, but consistent pragmatists are not. [p. 30] 
What this comes to is a little puzzling.50 What does she mean by 
"critical visions and imaginative recreations,,? Where in the prag-
matist's universe do they come from? Without doubt, imagination 
48. Radin believes that political double binds are a pervasive aspect of our political situa-
tion. On the one hand, attempting to transcend deeply entrenched meanings may create such 
a division between theory and practice that we are unable to make any real progress. On the 
other hand, a failure to challenge deeply entrenched meanings may reinforce ideology and 
make future progress that much more difficult. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
49. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
50. Nor are we helped by an earlier discussion of the problem: "A pragmatist does not 
suggest that all ideal theory is impossible or that we can somehow do without it altogether. 
Rather, for the pragmatist, theory is immanent and evolving; its development goes hand in 
hand with practice." P. 29. If theory is "immanent and evolving," how can it be at the same 
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is a good - perhaps even a pragmatic - thing. Under some cir-
cumstances, it may well help us to define the possibility of social 
change. It cannot, however, establish its desirability. Thus, Radin's 
response to the problem of bad coherence is not entirely satisfac-
tory. Radin is correct in her charge that the problem of bad coher-
ence is a problem of partial pragmatism. She errs, however, in 
thinking that imagination and critical vision supply the missing part. 
Either truth and virtue are solely matters of consensus and coher-
ence, or they are not. If they are, then human beings will inevitably 
be stuck with many deeply entrenched but backward conceptions. 
If they are not, then there is indeed something besides imagination 
missing from Radin's account of the pragmatic conception of truth. 
In other words, pragmatists are stuck on the horns of a dilemma. If 
everything is "contingent" and "socially constructed," then all of 
our norms and ideals are nothing more than temporary resting 
places in an ongoing process of social negotiation - resting places 
that have more to do with the realities of privilege and power than 
with aspirations for truth and justice. 
Among contemporary pragmatists, there is a dispute that sheds 
some light on this problem. On one side, there are pragmatists such 
as Richard Rorty who are uncompromising in their rejection of 
foundationalism. These pragmatists believe that what we call 
"truth" is nothing more than consensus and coherence,51 On the 
other side, there are pragmatists such as Hilary Putnam who, like 
Peirce and James, are committed to the use of a pragmatic 
method.52 This type of pragmatism insists upon more than consen-
sus and coherence. Beliefs are only true if they are arrived at in 
accordance with a certain method - the method that forms the 
basis of scientific practice. This results in a more robust notion of 
truth, but, at the same time, it reopens the question of foundational-
ism - if there is a uniquely correct method of inquiry, does it not 
function as an unquestioned, and unquestionable, foundation for 
human knowledge? To put it somewhat differently, if we canonize 
the contemporary understanding of scientific methodology, then 
have we not made a substantial retreat from our pragmatism? 
This dilemma and the dispute it prompts are central topics for 
pragmatic philosophers. Although it is obvious that Radin has not 
resolved these issues, there is much in her work that suggests possi-
ble resolutions. In particular, it is useful to think about her sugges-
tion that the feminist practice of consciousness-raising is a model of 
"pragmatist ... reconceptualization" (p. 30). Consciousness-raising 
time "ideal theory"? Ideal or utopian theories differ from immanent theories precisely in the 
fact that their development does not go "hand in hand with practice." 
51. Afterword, supra note 21, at 1917. 
52. Id. at 1914. 
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is not high theory. Women do it by talking about their lives in the 
simplest possible terms. Their focus is on careful observation of 
their own experience. In telling their stories, they question nor-
mally unquestioned assumptions and reject interpretations that are 
formulated in ordinary, patriarchal discourse. Consciousness-rais-
ing can challenge false consciousness and bad coherence precisely 
because of its commitment to an extremely rigorous form of empiri-
cism. In a similar fashion, the depth and relentlessness of pragma-
tism's own commitment to empiricism may provide a partial answer 
to the problem of bad coherence. If a belief coheres with our pre-
existing beliefs and attitudes, we are inclined to call it true. But as 
pragmatists, we should not take this as the end of the story. We 
must understand the belief in terms of its empirical consequences, 
and, if it concerns a matter that is important to us, we must test it 
aggressively against the onslaught of future experience. Thus, prag-
matism and feminism, properly understood, share a deep commit-
ment to a rigorous form of empirical inquiry. 
In short, one answer to the problem of bad coherence resides in 
the pragmatic maxim itself: "Consider what effects, that might con-
ceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our con-
ception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole 
of our conception of the object."53 The maxim prescribes not so 
much a method as a form of disciplined thinking. Abstract concep-
tions must be rigorously compared to practical expectations. Ex-
pectations must be continuously compared to actual experience. 
Ideological tones must always be mistrusted. Thus, while bad co-
herence is inevitable, it will never be permanent so long as we con-
tinue to think in the manner that is prescribed by the maxim. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I have examined a number of problems that arise in the context 
of Radin's pragmatism. Each of these problems relates to the na-
ture of ideals and their relationship to progressive social change. 
One problem is the problem of meaning: where do ideals come 
from? If meaning is always to be understood in terms of practical 
consequences, what are the practical consequences that attach to 
statements about ideals?S4 Another problem is the problem of rela-
tivism: what reason could there be for preferring our current ideals 
to our current practices? Yet another is the problem of motivation: 
if our visions of truth and justice are relative to our own individual 
history and perspective on the world, what motives could we -
53. PEIRCE, supra note 4, q[ 5.402. 
54. It is tempting to answer this question by saying that ideals are descriptions of individ-
ual dispositions towards certain kinds of behavior. If this is all that ideals are, however, they 
can explain human actions but not justify them. 
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either individually or as a society - ever have for genuine self-
transformation? A final problem is the problem of bad coherence: 
what do we do about the fact that consensus and coherence are 
often the products of dominance and coercion rather than sustained 
rational inquiry? 
None of these problems is unique to Radin; they are part and 
parcel of her commitment to pragmatism. Nevertheless they are 
serious problems. Indeed, the continuing usefulness of pragmatic 
analysis to matters of legal theory depends crucially upon on their 
resolution. But resolutions are hard to come by. Radin, in fact, 
does as well as any have done in addressing these issues - she has 
addressed them honestly and straightforwardly. But ultimately 
what she offers is not so much solutions as the hope of solutions to 
come - solutions that will come only if we are rigorous and relent-
less in our continuing commitment to a pragmatic method. 
